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This paper provides a detailed critical analysis of the case of Coman, where the Court of Justice clarified 
that the meaning of the term ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38 was gender-neutral, opening up the door for 
same-sex marriage recognition for immigration purposes all around the EU, thus destroying the 
heteronormative misinterpretations of the clear language of the Directive practiced in a handful of 
Member States. The state of EU law after Coman is still far from perfect, however: we underline a line 
of important questions which remain open and which the Court will need to turn to in the near future to 
ensure that marriage equality in moves beyond mere proclamations in the whole territory of the Union. 
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The case of Coman,1 decided on 5 June 2018, is akin to a lemma proven: totally unsurprising in terms 
of result, yet an achievement in terms of elegance and depth, leading to the further development of 
equality and non-discrimination law in Europe. The Grand Chamber clarified that the gender-neutral 
framing of ‘spouse’ in Article 2(2)(a) of the Citizenship Directive 2004/38 implies that, yes, indeed, 
married same-sex couples enjoy free movement rights equally to heterosexual married couples 
throughout the whole territory of the Union, no matter how each particular Member State frames 
‘family’ in its own legislation. This now includes situations where a gay union remains unrecognized in 
violation of ECHR law, as Article 8 ECHR contains a positive obligation to this effect,2 which is of 
sufficiently general nature,3 while differences based solely on sexual orientation are outlawed.4 This was 
exactly the case in Romania, where a Romanian-American, Mr Coman, wished to move in together with 
his American husband, Mr Hamilton. Discrimination on this ground is thus not any more inherent in the 
fabric of the internal market5 – a development as long awaited,6 as it is absolutely welcome, finally 
putting a thick full stop in a long esoteric debate concerning who should be entitled to define ‘spouse’ 
and what the term should mean.7 
 
1  Case C-673/16, Coman et al. v. Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.  
2  In ECtHR, Oliari et al. v. Italy, Appl. nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, judgment of 21 July 2015, the ECtHR found Italy to be 
in breach of Art. 8 ECHR for the failure to institute ‘a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection 
of … same-sex unions’ (para. 185). Cf. Ragone and Volpe, “An Emerging Right to a “Gay” Family Life? The Case Oliari 
v. Italy in a Comparative Perspective”, (2016), 17 GLJ 451. Even more: ECtHR held in Pajić v. Croatia Appl. No. 
68453/13, judgment of 23 February 2016, that a same-sex partnership implies a possibility of family reunification (paras. 
74-77, 85). In other words, if only Romania was a state compliant with ECHR law – an impossibility, of course – no 
recourse to EU law would be necessary at all in this case. 
3  There is a debate on the scope of the obligation contained in Oliari. In any event, the legal conditions of the Member States 
of the EU appear to be sufficiently similar to expect Romania to be bound by the obligation directed in Oliari to Italy. This 
is particularly so following Orlandi and Others v. Italy, Apps. Nos 26432/12. 26742/12, 44057/12 and 60088/12, judgment 
of 14 Dec. 2017, where the ECtHR required to introduce some form of recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad. But see, Tryfonidou, “The ECJ Recognises the Right of Same-Sex Spouses to Move Freely between EU Member 
States: The Coman Ruling”, ELRev. (2019, forthcoming). 
4  Vallianatos et al. v. Greece, App. nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, judgment of 7 November 2013, paras 77 and 92. 
5  And thus, a departure from earlier case-law, where the ECJ implied that ‘marriage’ is a union between a man and a woman: 
Joined Cases C-122 & 125/99, P, D. and Sweden v. Council ECLI:EU:C:2001:304, para. 34. 
6  See, among numerous other scholarly analyses arguing to the same effect: Bell and Bačić Selanec, “Who Is a “Spouse” under 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive? The Prospect of Mutual Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages in the EU”, 41 ELRev. (2016), 
655; Belavusau & Kochenov, “Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movements in the Growing EU”, in K. 
Slootmaeckers et al. (Eds.), The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics (Palgrave, 2016), 69-96; Tryfonidou, “EU Free 
Movement Law and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition”, 21 CJEL 
(2015), 195; Rijpma and  Koffeman, “Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples under EU Law: What Role to Play for 
the ECJ?”, in Gallo et al. (Eds), Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 2014), 455; Gruth, “When is a Partner not a Partner?: Conceptualizations of “Family” in EU Free 
Movement Law”, 33 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law (2011), 193; Kochenov, “On Options of Citizens and 
Moral Choices of States: Gays and European Federalism”, 33 FILJ (2009), 156; G.-R. de Groot, “Private International Law 
Aspects Relating to Homosexual Couples”, 11 Electronic J. Comparative L. (2007), 30; Kochenov, “Democracy and 
Human Rights – Not for Gay People?: EU Eastern Enlargement and Its Impact on the Protection of the Rights of Sexual 
Minorities”, 13 Texas Wesleyan L.Rev. (2007), 459; O’Neill, “Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in the European 
Community: the European Court of Justice’s Ability to Dictate Social Policy”, 37 Cornell International LJ (2004), 199; 
Bell, “We Are Family – Same-Sex  Partners and EU Migration Law”, 9 MJ (2002), 251–352; Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Lesbians 
and Gays and the Freedom of Movement of Persons”, in Waaldijk and Clapham (Eds.), Homosexuality: A European 
Community Issue (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 294. 
7  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Rights of Citizens of the Union 
and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77; 
corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2005 L 197, p. 34). See also Titshaw, “Same-Sex Spouses Lost in Translation? 
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This working paper will first present the facts and the law involved, as well as the turbulent context of 
a referendum, held in the Romania on 6 and 7 October 2018, to entrench the heteronormativity of the 
families recognized by law into the national constitution, akin to the ones in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. We will then set out, very briefly, the key lines of argument in 
Advocate General Wathelet’s Opinion, and summarize the decision of the Court.  
Having situated the Grand Chamber’s ruling in context, and explained the core achievements of the 
case, we will move to the analysis of the numerous outstanding problems the case failed to tackle. 5 
June 2018 is bound to remain a notable date on the calendar of achieving marriage equality, yet, 
crucially, our analysis will demonstrate that the EU is just at the beginning of a long road and plentiful 
crucial issues remained unresolved. The federalization of equality rights in the EU is a vitally important 
on-going development8 to which Coman has greatly contributed: EU sexual citizenship has just received 
a pivotal boost.9  
Factual and legal background in the context of Romanian developments 
The EU Citizens’ Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC employs gender-neutral language for family 
unions and partners.10 The Directive establishes several regimes for married, registered and unregistered 
partners. If a same-sex couple is married and the marriage is recognized in their previous Member State 
of residence, then EU law unquestionably requires the host state to recognize the marriage and makes 
family unification in the host-state automatic, irrespective of the nationality of the spouse of the EU 
citizen. The wording of the Directive is crystal-clear.11 In practice, host states not recognizing same-sex 
marriages often obstructed the practical enjoyment of the right of a spouse to join their partner,12 either 
refusing recognition all together, or treating marriage as a registered partnership, where the rules 
applicable under the Directive are more restrictive. Two situations are possible in the case of a registered 
partnership. Should the host Member State treat registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage, an 
individual then has the right to join his or her partner as if they were spouses.13 If the host state does not 
treat registered partnerships as equal to marriage, then the couple falls into the category of unregistered 
partners in a ‘durable relationship’.14 EU law creates no obligation to recognize registered partnerships 
as such. Instead, the Directive obliges Member States to ‘facilitate entry and residence’ to unregistered 
partners who are in a ‘durable relationship’. This blurry rule applies equally to same-sex couples and to 
 
How to Interpret ‘Spouse’ in the EU Family Migration Directives”, 34 Boston U. Int’l LJ (2016), 45; Guild, Peers & 
Tomkin, The EU Citizenship Directive: A Commentary (OUP, 2014). See equally the literature listed in note 6, supra. 
8  Belavusau & Kochenov, “Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movements in the Growing EU”, supra note 6, 69-96 
(in particular, on pp. 71-77 and 84-85 arguing for the reasoning adopted by the Court in its 2018 Coman decision back in 
2016).  
9  Belavusau, “EU Sexual Citizenship: Sex beyond the Internal Market”, in Kochenov (Ed.), EU Citizenship and Federalism: 
The Role of Rights (CUP, 2015) 417–442. 
10  In accordance Article 2(2) the Directive 2004/38, “(a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom the Union citizen has contracted 
a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats 
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant legislation 
of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are dependents and those of the spouse 
or partner as defined in point (b); (d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner 
as defined in point (b)”.  
11  Article 2(2)(a), Article 3(1) and (2)(a) and Article 7(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC (supra note 2).  
12  Examples of non-recognition range from Germany to Eastern European countries. See, for analyses, Bodnar and Śledzińska-
Simon, “Between Recognition and Homophobia: Same-Sex Couples in Eastern Europe”, in Gallo, Paladini and Pustorino 
(Eds), Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer, 2014), 211; Meeusen, 
“Instrumentalization of Private International Law in the European Union: Towards a European Conflicts Revolution?”, 9 
EJML (2007), 287 (at 297). 
13  Article 2(2)(b). 
14  Article 3(2)(b).  
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couples of the opposite sex. Either registered or unregistered partners thus do not enjoy the same right 
as a spouse to join their partners. The worst cases arise, however, when a Member State does not 
recognize any form of same-sex partnerships, leading to a situation when its territory is de facto removed 
from the geographical scope of application of free movement of persons law of the EU, as far as same-
sex (married) partners are concerned. To put it differently: homophobia switches off internal market law 
in such cases, depriving EU citizens of their free movement rights. 
This third, worst, situation for the (married) same-sex partners was exactly the one at issue in Coman. 
Following several years of living together in New York, Mr Relu Adrian Coman, who holds Romanian 
and US citizenship, and Mr Robert Clabourn Hamilton, an American citizen, got married in Brussels in 
2010, where Mr Coman took up residence to work as a parliamentary assistant at the European 
Parliament. Such a marriage would not be possible in Romania, a country among the last of all the 
current Member States of the EU to de-criminalize homosexuality and one that does not offer the 
institutions of either marriage or partnership for same-sex partners. Following several years in a long-
distance relationship, Coman and Hamilton decided to settle in Romania, and Mr Coman applied for a 
residence-permit for his American husband based on the family reunification clause of Directive 
2004/38. Expectedly, Romanian authorities refused to abide by the Directive, explaining their decision 
by non-recognition of “homosexual unions” in Romania. Supported by the reputable LGBT organization 
Asociaţia ACCEPT, the couple appealed the decision of the Romanian authorities.15 When their case 
reached the Constitutional Court of Romania (Curtea Constituțională), the court decided to stay the 
proceedings and submitted a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice to clarify the conditions under 
which Mr Hamilton may be granted the right to reside in Romania for more than three months. 
Although the constitution of Romania, unlike the constitutional texts of Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, contains a gender-neutral phrasing surrounding ‘family’, the 
Romanian Civil Code (Codul Civil) not only defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman,16 but 
also stipulates – in a rather atypical manner for continental civil codes – that “marriage between persons 
of the same sex shall be prohibited” and, even more specifically, “marriages between persons of the 
same sex entered into or contracted abroad by Romanian citizens or by foreigners shall not be recognized 
in Romania”.17 Far from being dead-letter, the formulation contained in Codul Civil in fact affected the 
meaning that the Constitutional Court of Romania has given to the gender neutral provision of the 
constitution. In other words, the case of Coman arouse in a very hostile legal context. 
Politically, poisonous turmoil of Romanian public life marked by countless scandals, mass protests and 
corruption,18 also unquestionably boasts an on-going homophobic line to it. The centre-stage here is 
occupied by the Romanian ‘Campaign for Family’ NGO Coalition, which collected 3.000.000 signatures 
in the span of six months in 2016 in order to hold a national referendum to amend the Constitution of 
the country. This initiative replaced a gender-neutral definition of marriage with a restrictive one, 
presenting marriage as a union between a man and a woman. This is an astonishingly large number of 
signatures for a country of less than 20 million inhabitants; just half a million signatures create a legal 
obligation to initiate the process. Even more strikingly, the Romanian Constitutional Court did not see 
any problem with the substance of the proposed amendment, alleging in fact that it was unnecessary 
given that, although gender-neutral, the relevant provision of the Constitution (Article 48(1)) already 
 
15  Coman is the second case regarding discrimination on sexual orientation from Romania, and the second supported by 
Asociaţia ACCEPT, following their win in Case C-81/12 Asociaţia ACCEPT v Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea 
Discriminării, EU:C:2013:275. Cf. Belavusau, “A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law: 
Comment on Asociaţia ACCEPT”, 21 CJEL (2014), 353. 
16  Art. 259(1) and (2) of the Civil Code of Romania.  
17  Art. 227(1), (2) and (4) of the Civil Code of Romania. 
18  Perju, “The Romanian Double Executive and the 2012 Constitutional Crisis”, 13 I-CON (2015), 246. 
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implied the prohibition of same-sex marriage, as Constantin Cojocariu reported.19 The referendum, held 
in October 2018, failed due to low turnout – only 20% of the voters, instead of at least 30% required, 
showed up to vote. The story of the referendum demonstrates quite clearly that the country essentially 
has not moved far away from its pre-accession stance, where parliamentarians worried that the 
membership of the EU could actually undermine the situation of steep discrimination against sexual 
minorities and when the Romanian Orthodox Church campaigned incessantly against the 
decriminalization of homosexuality.20 When explained that EU law honours basic principles of dignity, 
equality and non-discrimination the members of the Romanian parliament expressed worries and 
confusion: entering the EU was not supposed to mean ‘entering Sodom and Gomorrah’.21 Coman, 
therefore, will no doubt renew the fears in these circles.  
Opinion of the Advocate General  
On 11 January 2018, Advocate General Melchior Wathelet delivered his Opinion, which was largely 
based on exploring two possible paradigms of interpreting the available secondary law of the Union in 
this case. According to the applicants, the Dutch Government, and the Commission, Article 2(2)(a) of 
Directive 2004/38 must be given a uniform autonomous interpretation. According to that interpretation, 
the national of a third country of the same sex as the Union citizen to whom he or she is lawfully married 
in accordance with the law of a Member state is covered by the term “spouse”. In contrast, the Romanian, 
Latvian, Hungarian and Polish governments contended that the term “spouse” does not fall within the 
scope of EU law, but must be defined in the light of the law of the host Member State.22 The AG opted 
for the first approach, considering that the autonomous interpretation must be applied and that the 
meaning of the term “spouse” used in Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2004/38 must be independent of the 
sex of the person who is married to a Union citizen.23 The AG further looked into the argument advanced 
by the Latvian government regarding the justification by “national identity” on behalf of Romania 
regarding the supposedly sensitive status of marriage. To this the learned AG answered that, if the 
concept of marriage were to be considered related to national identity in certain Member States, the 
obligation to respect that identity, which is set out in Article 4(2) TEU, cannot be construed 
independently of the obligation of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU.24 
The AG further explored the drafting history of Directive 2004/38 and concluded that the chosen word 
(“spouse”) was deliberately neutral.25 Although the expression “spouse” had previously been used by 
the Commission in its initial proposal, the Parliament wished to mention the irrelevance of the sex of 
the person concerned, by adding the words “irrespective of sex, according to the relevant national 
legislation”. However, the Council expressed its reluctance to opt for a definition of the term “spouse” 
that would expressly include spouses of the same sex. At the time, only two Member states had adopted 
legislation authorizing marriage between person of the same sex, and the Court had previously held that 
the definition of marriage generally accepted by the Member states at the time referred to a union 
between two persons of opposite sex. Relying on the Council’s concerns, the Commission preferred to 
“restrict [its] proposal to the concept of spouse as meaning in principle spouse of a different sex, unless 
 
19  Cojocariu, “Same-Sex Marriage before the Courts and before the People: The Story of a Tumultuous Year for LGBT Rights 
in Romania”, Verfassungsblog (25 January 2017), available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/same-sex-marriage-before-the-
courts-and-before-the-people-the-story-of-a-tumultuous-year-for-lgbt-rights-in-romania/. 
20  Turcescu and Stan, “Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania”, 57 Europe-Asia Studies (2005), 291. 
21  Ibid., 294. 
22  Para 31 of the AG Opinion.  
23  Para. 32 of the AG Opinion.   
24  Para. 40 of the AG Opinion.  
25  Para. 51 of the AG Opinion.  
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there are subsequent developments”.26 The AG therefore concluded that no argument in favour of one 
interpretation over the other could be derived from the drafting history of the Directive,27 and that the 
wording of the term “spouse” in the Directive was neutral based on the context and the objective of the 
Directive.28 The AG further affirmed that EU law must be interpreted “in the light of the present day 
circumstances”,29 and, based on statistical and comparative analysis from various jurisdictions regarding 
the scope of fundamental rights,30 concluded that the broad interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ provides 
the optimum respect for family life guaranteed in Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
while leaving to Member States the freedom to authorize – or not –  a marriage between persons of the 
same sex.31 Likewise, the AG concluded that the objective pursued by the Directive 2004/38 supports a 
broad autonomous interpretation of the term ‘spouse’, independent of sexual orientation32 The AG has 
also suggested a plan B to the Court, in case it would not follow his suggested reasoning about the 
interpretation of ‘spouse’. If Mr Coman’s husband was not a ‘spouse’ due to Romanian law, he had to 
be considered a partner or other family member under Article 3 of the Directive. The Opinion argued 
that due to the marital bond recognized by another Member State, there would be no discretion to refuse 
admission in this case.33  
Judgment of the Court of Justice  
In its preliminary observations, the Court presented its major finding; that if during the genuine residence 
of a Union citizen in a Member State other than that of which (s)he is a national, family life is created 
or strengthened, TFEU requires that the citizen’s family life may continue when (s)he returns to the 
Member State of origin.34 Although the Directive, which aims to regulate the rights of EU citizens 
outside of their Member State of nationality, would not apply to such cases directly, Article 21(2) TFEU 
is unquestionably applicable by analogy.35 If no such derived right of residence were granted, the Union 
citizen would be discouraged from exercising rights under EU law. The Court, therefore, logically based 
the questions referred by the national court on the premise that, during the period of his genuine 
residence in Belgium, Mr Coman created or strengthened a family life with Mr Hamilton.36 The Court 
then continued with an unequivocal interpretation that the term ‘spouse’ within the meaning of Directive 
2004/38 was gender-neutral. It could therefore cover the same-sex spouse of the Union citizens 
concerned.37 It followed that a Member State cannot rely on its national law as justification for refusing 
to recognize in its territory a marriage concluded by that national with a Union citizen of the same sex 
in another Member State, in accordance with the law of that state, for the sole purpose of granting a 
derived right of residence to a third-country national.38 Admittedly, a person’s status, which is relevant 
to the rules on marriage, remains a matter that falls within the competence of the Member States, and 
 
26  Para. 51 of the AG Opinion.  
27  Para. 52 of the AG Opinion.  
28  Para. 53 of the AG Opinion.  
29  Para. 56 of the AG Opinion.  
30  Paras 57–67 of the AG Opinion.  
31  Para. 67 of the AG Opinion.  
32  Paras 68–76 of the AG Opinion.  
33  On this point, see Peers, “Love Wins in the ECJ: Same Sex Marriages and EU Free Movement Law”, EU Law Analysis Blog 
(5 June 2018), available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/06/love-wins-in-ECJ-same-sex-marriages.html  
34  Para. 24.  
35  Para. 23. Compare: Judgment of 14 November 2017, Lounes, Case C-165/16, EU:C:2017:862, para. 46. 
36  Para. 26.  
37  Para. 35.  
38  Para. 35.  
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EU law does not detract from that competence. The Member States are thus free to decide whether or 
not to allow marriage for persons for the same sex.39 Nevertheless, the Court stressed that it was well-
established case-law that, in exercising the competence, Member States must comply with EU law, in 
particular the Treaty provisions on the freedom conferred on all Union citizens to move and reside in 
the territory of the Member States.40 
Subsequently, the Court built on the observation of the Advocate General,41 finding that to allow 
Member States the freedom to refuse residence in their territory to a third-country national whose 
marriage to a Union citizen was concluded in another Member State in accordance with the law of that 
state, based on whether national law allows marriage to persons of the same sex, would cause free 
movement of Union citizens to vary amongst Member States. Such a situation would be at odds with 
the Court’s case-law, to the effect that, in light of its context and objectives, the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 may not be interpreted restrictively and might be deprived of their effectiveness.42 From this 
finding, the Court proceeded to assess possible legal justifications for such a restrictive measure at place 
in Romania. In order to be justifiable, this measure must be based on objective public interest 
considerations and be proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued by national law.43 Latvia and 
Poland, in their submissions to the Court, referred to public policy and national identity considerations 
as legitimate public-interest reasons relevant for a number of Member States at stake.44 To this 
observation, the Court commented, however, that public policy may be relied on only if there is a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society,45 which is not on the surface 
appliable in the present case. Recognizing a same-sex marriage registered in another Member state for 
the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence does not undermine the institution of marriage 
in Romania.46 Further on, the Court strengthened its view by referring to provisions of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights on family rights and privacy.47 
It therefore concluded that TFEU must be interpreted as precluding Romanian authorities from refusing 
to grant a third-country national spouse a right of residence in Romania on the ground that the Romanian 
law does not recognize marriage between persons of the same sex.48 Likewise, the Court has concluded 
that this right for third country nationals like Mr Hamilton, who are married in another Member State 
recognizing same-sex marriage, goes together with the right to reside in the territory of Romania for 
more than three months.49 
An unquestionable achievement of the Court of Justice 
The Court’s decision in Coman is unequivocal. When a Union citizen has made use of the freedom of 
movement by taking up genuine residence in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, 
Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of the Member State of 
which the Union citizen is a national from refusing to grant their third-country national spouse a right 
of residence in the territory of that Member State on the ground that the law of that Member State does 
 
39  Para. 37. Compare: Judgment of 24 November 2016, Parris, Case C-443/15, EU:C:2016:897, para. 59.  
40  Para. 38.  
41  Para. 73 of the AG Opinion.  
42  Para. 39 of the Judgment.  
43  Para. 41.  
44  Para. 43.  
45  Para. 44.  
46  Para. 45.  
47  Paras 49 and 50.  
48  Para. 51.  
49  Para. 56.  
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not recognize marriage between persons of the same sex for the purposes of residence in that Member 
State. More importantly, the Court refused to extend public policy derogations available in EU primary 
law to moralistic concerns of the Member States. The Court did not impose on all the Member States an 
obligation to introduce an institution of same-sex marriage or partnership; doing this would be both 
questionable in terms of EU competence limitations, as family matters lie within the realm of the 
national law of the Member States, and redundant in the light of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) case-law, which has already established such an obligation. It did, however, demand single-
purpose recognition of the status attached to same-sex marriage where this institution exists in the 
Member States in Member States where it is legally unknown, in order to ensure that free movement 
can be enjoyed without discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation all across the territory of the 
Union. Particularly important in this regard is the outright dismissal of the esoteric defense of moral 
choices to discriminate without any critical scrutiny, clothed by the terminology of “constitutional 
identity”,50 which has played its ambiguous role in the line of case law regarding the right to a name.51 
It is thus a most welcome and atypical development, given prior case law, that the ECJ does not use 
identity excuses in order to humiliate minorities when sexual minorities are involved.52 The absurdity 
of the ‘protection of the traditional family’ argument, which lies at the core of ‘identity’ considerations, 
was outlined by AG Wathelet, as well as previously by AG Jääskinen in his Opinion in Römer,53 and, 
given its obvious clarity, diverging from it would be difficult for the Court.  
Hence, indeed, there are no surprises. The outcome and reasoning of Coman has been awaited in the 
literature for years, and has been discussed at countless conferences, including the meetings uniting 
renowned authorities in the field of EU law, such as London-Leiden seminars.54 All types of 
interpretations of the Directive in question; its drafting history;55 as well as parallels with other fields 
where mutual recognition is similarly required in the context of the lack of EU’s legislative competence, 
in particular the recognition of names;56 with all the rich case-law at hand, all warrant a conclusion that 
Coman is among the best-founded decisions of the Court in its history from the viewpoints of legal 
certainty and the articulation of the letter and the spirit of the law. 
The outcome was mandated by the language of the relevant legal provisions since their inception, and 
could thus only seem problematic in the context of EU law, where the key principle, to agree with 
Somek, is the lack of clarity.57 Even a purposefully gender-neutral ‘spouse’ in the Directive 2004/3858 
was regarded as ‘unclear’ and ‘in need of clarification’. It is now clear: gender neutral, clarified the 
 
50  Article 4(2) TEU. See Cloots, National Identity in EU Law (OUP, 2015).  
51  Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806; Case C-391/09 Malgožata 
Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės administracija and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:291. For a detailed analysis of this stream of cases, critiquing the Court for playing the tune of 
nationalism, see Kochenov, “When Equality Directives are Not Enough: Taking an Issue with the Missing Minority Rights 
Policy in the EU”, in Belavusau and Henrard (Eds.), EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender (Hart, 2018).  
52  On this point, see Farraguna, “L’amore vince (e l’identità nazionale perde?): il caso Coman alla Corte di giustizia”, 3 
Quaderni costituzionali (2018), 711-714. 
53  Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Case C-147/08 Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECLI:EU:C:2010:425, para. 175. 
54  See the literature in note 6 above. 
55  See Titshaw, supra note 7, at 92–106; C. Bell and Bačić Selanec, supra note 6, at 657; M. Bell, “Holding Back the Tide? 
Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships within the European Union”, 12 European Review of Private Law 
(2004), 613. 
56  See, for the most rigorous treatment, Van den Brink, “What’s in a Name? Some Lessons for the Debate over the Free 
Movement of Same-Sex Couples within the EU”, 17 GLJ (2016), 421; C. Bell and Bačić Selanec, supra note 6, at 662–
666. 
57  Somek, “Is Legality a Principle of EU Law?”, in Vogenauer and Weatherill (Eds.), General Principles of Law: European 
and Comparative Perspectives (Hart, 2017). 
58  Art. 2(2)(a) Directive 2004/38. Cf. Titshaw, supra note 7, at 92–106; C. Bell and Bačić Selanec, supra note 6, at 657; M. 
Bell, supra note 55. 
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Court, indeed means gender neutral. We read in para. 34 that “the term ‘spouse’ […] refers to a person 
joined to another person by the bonds of marriage”.59 Again, this is the least surprising and among the 
most-awaited findings of the Court of Justice in the history of EU law. While the opinions regarding the 
impact of Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of same-sex couples were divided,60 Directive 
2004/38 is much clearer. According to Recital 31 of Directive 2004/38, “Member States should 
implement this Directive without discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds 
such as [inter alia] sexual orientation”.  
Most surprisingly, however, until Coman, the ECJ has not had a chance to demand either absolute 
mutual recognition of same-sex couples moving between Member States, nor to clarify the meaning of 
a term ‘spouse’ under Directive 2004/38/EC – the two options that have been evidently open for 
changing the current practice of national-level non-compliance in a number of Member States. The EU 
free movement of persons regime has thus tolerated discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual 
orientation as its starting point, a regrettable situation long described in the literature in detail.61 The 
early case of P. v. S (1996),62 where the ECJ used a gender equality clause to protect the rights of 
transsexuals, was already a huge achievement for LGBT rights, considering that back in the 1950s, when 
the European Economic Community was established, judges all over Europe (including the Council of 
Europe’s European Commission for Human Rights) employed the language of crime, pathology and 
deviation when describing any alternative sexuality or gender identity.63 Indeed, the WHO removed 
homosexuality from its list of diseases only in 1992.64 P. v. S. was of little help to lesbian and gay 
couples, however, as the ECJ refused to apply its sexual discrimination approach to such relationships.65 
This produced a truly shaky, if not outright shameful, jurisprudence that has now been laid to rest,66  
though not explicitly overruled (the question ‘why not’ remains). In the EU of Grant v. SWT, gay couples 
remained entirely unprotected, the calls to the contrary from the European Parliament notwithstanding.67 
The introduction of sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination via Article 19 TFEU, and 
subsequent harmonization of this equality field “beyond gender” by 2000 Equality Directives, has 
 
59  An explicit statement of the gender-neutral essence of the term is unequivocally stated in para. 35. 
60  Cf. Clapham and Weiler, “Lesbians and Gay Men in the European Community Legal Order”, in Waaldijk and Clapham 
(Eds.), Homosexuality: A European Community Issue: Essays on Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and Policy 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 7. 
61  See, especially, Waaldijk and Clapham (Eds.), Homosexuality: A European Community Issue (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993). See, 
especially, Jessurun d’Oliveira’s contribution to this volume, supra note 6; Wintermute & Andenæs (Eds.), Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law (Hart, 2001). 
62  C-13/94 P. v. S  and Cornwall County Council (1996), ECLI:EU:C:1996:170. 
63  Criminalization of homosexuality was not seen as contrary to Art. 8 ECHR. E.g.: ECtHR, W.B. v. Germany, Appl. No. 
104/55, judgment of December 17, 1955; ECtHR, X. v. Germany, Appl. No. 5935/72, judgment of September 30, 1975; 
ECtHR, Dudgeon v. UK, App. No. 7525/76, judgment of 22 October 1981. Even more, the European Commission for 
Human Rights has explicitly excluded same-sex relationships from the scope of Article 8 ECHR as inferior to ‘family’: X 
& Y, Appl. No. 9369/83. Such reading of Art. 8 ECHR persisted well into the first decade of this century: ECtHR, Karner 
v. Austria, Appl. No. 40016/98, judgment of 24 July 2003; ECtHR, Kozak v. Poland, Appl. No. 13102/02, judgment of 2 
March 2010. Cf. Fichera, “Same-Sex Marriage and the Role of Transnational Law: Changes in the European Landscape”, 
17 GLJ (2016), 384, 389–297.  
64  About medicalization of the homosexual subject in EU and comparative law, see Belavusau, “Towards EU Sexual Risk 
Regulation: Restrictions on Blood Donation as Infringement of Active Citizenship”, 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation 
(2016) 801-809. 
65  Kochenov, “On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States”, supra note 6. 
66  Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains Ltd, EU:C:1998:63. See Koppelman, “The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or, 
Lisa Grant Meets Adolph Hitler”, in Wintermute & Andenæs (Eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study 
of National, European and International Law (Hart, 2001).  
67  European Parliament, Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and Lesbians in the European Community, 1994 OJ C 
61; European Parliament, Resolution of Equal Rights for Gays and Lesbians in the European Community, 1998 OJ C 313. 
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changed the situation slightly, but has not solved the core outstanding problems.68 The Court’s post-
2000 jurisprudence has largely failed to make any real break-throughs regarding recognition of the equal 
status for same-sex unions, some achievements notwithstanding:69 free movement of persons in the 
territory of the Member States remained, for gay people, but a promise, a myth. The case of Coman 
transcends this narrow paradigm of discrimination within employment schemes and extends it to the 
federal horizons, clearly mimicking the earlier jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and establishing 
for gay couples what heterosexuals could enjoy all-along: basic protections of free movement of persons 
in the internal market.  
Notwithstanding its significance, Coman, where the Court found that same-sex spouses should enjoy 
free movement rights in the EU (including the crucial right to return home in Singh situations)70 en par 
with heterosexual spouses, is not a revolution. In essence, it has established the importance of absolute 
mutual recognition of each other’s meanings of ‘spouse’ between the Member States for the purposes 
of EU free movement of citizens law.71 Most fundamentally, however elementary and much expected, 
the case of Coman has a huge impact on the lives of plenty of same-sex spouses around the EU whose 
legally-celebrated marriages have not been recognized as a result of the failure of a large number of 
Member States to implement Directive 2004/38 correctly.  
Problems and open questions 
It would be unwise to present Coman in a solely celebratory light. The case poses a number of important 
questions, which will only be answered in case law and practice in the years to come. Let us have a look 
at the most important features of the case likely to have lasting significance through either remaining 
problematic, or by providing further food for thought for lawyers and policy-makers. 
Questions about the Commission’s effectiveness and the failure of conditionality 
The case of Coman allows one to ask where the Commission, the ‘guardian of the Treaties’, was in a 
situation where, for more than ten years,72 several Member States obviously implemented and applied 
Directive 2004/38 wrongly toward gay spouses, undermining the letter and the spirit of the law and 
derailing the lives of countless EU citizens.73 It is quite surprising that no commentator, to our 
knowledge, actually expected Article 258 TFEU – with all its drawbacks, still a usable instrument74 – 
rather than Article 267 TFEU, to end the obvious injustice and mistreatment of families when the 
gender-neutral text of the Directive was abundantly clear. After all, equality and non-discrimination are 
also among the values on which the Union is built upon, as per the Treaty text, most notably Article 2 
 
68  Belavusau & Henrard (Eds.), EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender (Hart, 2018).  
69  For a superb, theoretically able overview, see Fichera, supra note 63. See also Rijpma and Koffeman, “Free Movement 
Rights for Same-Sex Couples under EU Law: What Role to Play for the ECJ?”, in Gallo et al. (Eds.), Same-Sex Couples 
before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2014). 
70  Case C-218/14 Singh and Others v Minister for Justice and Equality (2015), ECLI:EU:C:2015:476. 
71  See also Rijpma and  Koffeman, supra note 69; Jessurun d’Oliveira, “Freedom of Movement of Spouses and Registered 
Partners in the European Union”, in Private Law in the International Arena: Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr (2000), 527. 
72  The implementation deadline of Directive 2004/38 has expired long ago. 
73  For those still not convinced that this indeed has been the case even in the light of all the arguments presented above, the 
Commission’s own implementation guidelines for better transposition of Directive 2004/38 could provide an additional 
illustration of why Romania failed to implement the Directive correctly and that the ECJ’s decision in Coman cannot be 
regarded as in any way surprising by the Commission in the light of its own documents. 
74  Gormley, “Infringement Proceedings”, in Jakab & Kochenov (Eds), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values (OUP, 2017).     
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TEU.75 Although the general ability of the EU institutions to enforce these values has been far from 
obvious to commentators as of late,76 the Commission could in fact do much more than bringing Article 
258 TFEU cases against the Romanias of our Union. Unlike in cases of rule of law or democracy 
backsliding – such as Hungary and Poland77 – the values at play in the context of same-sex families are 
not at the fringes of the acquis, but in the text of the Directive itself, which instantly removes plenty of 
problems faced by the institution in other value-spheres.78 While nothing has been done – and in this we 
emphasize the shame of the Commission for not acting – the embarrassment was particularly reinforced 
by the silence from the Commission on this issue in its regular reports on EU citizenship. Article 258 
TFEU is clearly open to the Commission now that Coman has restated the obvious. Given that Romania 
is not the only state acting in this homophobic fashion, and the fact that ‘spouse’ in the Directive is 
gender-neutral, it is up to the Commission to ensure that Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Slovakia, whatever their constitutions are said to mandate, all honour same-sex marriages 
for the purposes of free movement. Even more: all the Member States not providing for same-sex 
marriage, such as Italy or Slovenia, will have to ensure, in practice and on paper, that the unconditional 
nature of the admission of same-sex spouses in the situations falling within the scope of application of 
Directive 2004/38 and of Coman’s Singh-inspired scope, can fully benefit from the automatic nature of 
spousal admission in Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive, without any illegal attempts to treat spouses as 
‘registered partners’. It is now clear that any attempt to do that would be a wrongful implementation of 
the Directive 2004/38. 
An even more acute question arises, however, out of the Commission’s inaction. The Member States 
recently admitted to the Union and known to be problematic in the context of gender equality face 
overwhelming scrutiny from the Commission under the Council’s mandate to implement the 
conditionality principle.79 Sneaking the twin equality directives of 2000 through the legislative process 
allowed the Union to move on from the humiliation of Grant. Even so, the Commission admitted states 
expected to oppose same-sex marriage and the improvement of the rights situation of the LGBT 
community in the context of a broader ‘Failure of Conditionality’ exercise,80 where anti-gay legislation 
and practice has not in fact deterred their membership,81 including in particular the case of Romania.82 
They have also been free to continue that which had to be solved before they became Member States 
post-accession. 
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Questions about the sustainability of a single-purpose recognition 
There is no secret that Coman is, in essence, about immigration rights. When same-sex spouses move 
to a Member State which, in breach of the ECHR law83 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU,84 refuses to provide any legal form of recognition for same sex-relationships, it unequivocally 
obliges the Member State to recognize the marriage as such. The consequences of such ‘single purpose’ 
recognition, to borrow from David de Groot,85 is that all the other rights enjoyed by family members 
around the EU might still regrettably lie outside the reach of the same-sex spouses who successfully 
invoked EU law to move to a homophobic Member State. Lacking these rights, which could include 
inheritance, taking up the lease, survivor pension, hospital visits, or raising children together,86 could 
still pose huge problems in such Member States, and will require further litigation. 
David de Groot is thus justified in doubting whether the case of Coman will have any immediate 
implications at all for the actual recognition of the marriage in question by the Romanian authorities.87 
The meaning acquired by Article 8 ECHR in Oliari et al., however, is a powerful helping hand in the 
context of the unconditional mutual recognition argument, which the ECJ made in Coman. Acting 
otherwise could, essentially, amount to allowing for the limitations of the free movement rights of some 
families based on a national rule, which is in breach of Article 8 ECHR. This would deviate entirely 
from the logic of the Union as a constitutional system respecting human rights and violate the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, with its gender-neutral framing of the right in Article 9. Incidentally, Article 9 
itself inspired a change of heart by the ECtHR, showcasing a spectacular example of cross-pollination 
between the two supranational legal systems in Europe.88 The Charter, once it entered into force, was 
taken to signify a new consensus among the European states on the important issue of same-sex 
relationships, thus mandating the evolution of Strasbourg case law.89 
Important in this respect is the fact that ECHR and Charter rights, as deployed, would squarely fit within 
the free-movement internal market paradigm of EU integration. Such rights could thus unquestionably 
expect protection even where the approach to rights as such in EU law is chiefly instrumental, as the 
Court has explained in Opinion 2/13.90 Whether the Court is to be blamed for not doing more in Coman 
to avoid the hint of ‘single purpose’ is an open question.91 Family, after all, is famously outside the scope 
of EU law as it were – Poland even appended a declaration to this effect to the Treaties. When treading 
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in such contentious fields, particular caution is required.92  It is thus possible to agree with Alina 
Tryfonidou, that “in EU Member States, full marriage equality is unlikely to be imposed from above”.93 
Questions about the acceptability of the free movement paradigm for non-discrimination 
Single-purpose recognition is not the whole story. The case of Coman reinforces a very particular view 
of EU law. The free-movement paradigm has little to offer to those who would expect their dignity and 
family life protected without pleasing the ‘apolitical’ rationale of the internal market:94 those who stay 
at home,95 those who would be ‘illegal’ in a host Member State – for example, Miss Dano, in love with 
another Roma lady96 – and many others. The Coman victory is thus cum grano salis: it is too self-
consciously aware of its federal limitations in terms of competence.97 The Court was too afraid to tread 
on the long Polish tradition of discriminatory family ideals and Latvia’s arguments of ‘constitutional 
identity’, implying that ‘identity’ consists in ensuring that, in a Union where sex and sexual-orientation 
discrimination are illegal,98 and tolerance is one of the values of Article 2 TEU, these goals are never 
reached, and gay families remain persecuted. This is, to agree with Massimo Fichera, one of the core 
problems with free movement law as such. “It seems to be built on what is considered ‘normal,’ so that 
deviations from normalcy are not contemplated”.99 At the same time, the justification behind the choice 
of the key paradigm of ‘normal’ to be protected are blurry and not always clear, to say the least. This 
has the effect of punishing those persons and relationships that do not fall within the proclaimed ‘good 
citizenship’ ideal,100 be it a same-sex family, a person with a disability,101 or a woman absent from work 
during pregnancy.102 Coman represents enormous progress compared with Grant v. SWT just twenty 
years ago, warranting one of the authors of this note to correct his earlier statement calling the Grant 
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Court a “homophobic bench”.103 It is still far-removed from the basic Karstean dignity-oriented 
approach104 demonstrated by other jurisdictions around the world. It is thus not marriage equality, it is 
the boosting of the internal market ideology, rightly described by Weiler as standing ‘naked, without a 
mantle of ideals’,105 that the case of Coman has advanced. 
Consequently, the gay community faces a situation where, though the dignity of fundamental human 
bonds is unquestionably recognized, loving each other is only possible in the Union today if one avails 
themselves of at least some protections of the law, particularly when the context is ‘cross-border’ and 
market friendly. ‘Bad citizens’ of the EU, unlike the ‘good citizens’, fail to understand and live by the 
ideal of the internal market and cross-border movement, and as such do not enjoy the most basic dignity 
under EU law. Family life for gay EU citizens is still light years away from being fully recognized and 
solidified as a true enforceable right at the level of EU law. It is not mentioned in Part II TFEU and thus, 
apparently, is not part of ‘other rights in the Treaties’, which Article 20 TFEU refers to, pace Article 9 
CFR, 106  
Questions about coherence across different instruments of secondary law 
Coman has implications for the understanding of the meaning of ‘spouse’ in the context of other 
secondary EU law, especially the Family Reunification Directive.107 Although today’s practice in some 
Member States, as Titshaw reports,108 treats same-sex couples under different directives differently, such 
practice unquestionably falls short of the idea of uniform application of EU law. This implies that the 
semantic unity of the key notions it operates with, as well the compliance with ECHR law, as non-
discrimination, family, and private life in the ECHR, are not citizenship-specific and bind the states-
parties equally in their regulation of the family life of own and EU citizens, as well as foreigners. 
The question of ‘genuine residence’ 
That ‘genuine residence’ is required is of course a problem, since the direct consequence of someone’s 
residence being deemed ‘genuine’ is the ability to go on effectively enjoying family life and dignity. In 
the context where the meaning of ‘residence’ in the law does not overlap neatly with physical presence, 
a ‘genuine residence’ under the law of several Member States is nothing else but the possession of a 
legally-acquired residence title. It seems to be highly problematic to demand more, especially where 
someone’s family life is dependent on this. To put it differently, this allows for ‘abuse of law’.109 The 
Commission, as we have discussed above, does not do enough to promote gay rights and non-
discrimination against same-sex families. At the same time, for some couples, establishing residence 
elsewhere is the only way to gain dignity and basic legal recognition for one’s same-sex family under 
 
103  Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States’, supra note 6, at 157. On the generally poor track-record 
of the ECJ in dealing with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the Union see, e.g., Mulder, “Some More 
Equal Than Others? Matrimonial Benefits and the ECJ’s Case-Law on Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation”, 19 MJ (2012), 505; Pech, “Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s Sidestepping 
of Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez” 49 CMLRev. (2012), 1841; Kochenov, ‘Democracy and 
Human Rights – Not for Gay People?’, supra note 6. 
104  Karst, “The Freedom of Intimate Association”, 89 Yale L.J. (1980), 624. 
105  Weiler, “Bread and Circus: The State of the European Union”, 4 CJEL (1998), 223, at 231.  
106  Compare with Kochenov, “Gay Rights in the EU: A Long Way Forward for the Union of 27”, 3 Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy (2007), 469; Cf. Waaldijk, ‘Great Diversity and Some Equality: Non-Marital Legal Family 
Formats for Same-Sex Couples in Europe’, 1 Genius (2014), 42. 
107  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification; Titshaw, supra note 7, at 45. 
108  Titshaw, supra note 7, at 58. 
109  See, for a superbly detailed treatment, Kroeze, “Distinguishing between Use and Abuse of EU Free Movement Law”, 4 
European Papers (2018). 
Dimitry Kochenov and Uladzislau Belavusau 
14 Department of Law Working Papers 
the law of a Member State. For Coman to include a criterion judging how ‘genuine’ someone’s residence 
is amounts to one thing: supplying homophobic states with an additional argument to avoid complying 
with the law, so that they may continue discriminating against sexual minorities. Such an approach 
invites a whole range of problematic questions and seems to be anything but sustainable.   
Questions about the utility of private international law approaches 
Speaking of a ‘marriage lawfully concluded in the host Member State’, Coman does not answer crucial 
questions about the very possibility of the celebration of a same-sex marriage in contemporary EU law. 
The ECJ has now officially endorsed setting aside private law rules in Coman situations,110 but they 
could offer an impenetrable obstacle to the establishment of a marriage in law. This is another issue in 
line to be tackled in order to make Coman fully effective. This is due to the fact that precisely because 
of discrimination in the law of the Member State of nationality, making same-sex marriages impossible, 
the celebration of such a marriage in a different Member State could also be hindered, as Ulli Jessurun 
d’Oliveira has wonderfully explained.111 For example, in cases where a same-sex marriage is being 
celebrated, Belgian law allows departure from the requirement of compliance with the national law of 
the state of nationality of the partners prohibiting same-sex marriage, if the law of the state of nationality 
or habitual residence of one of the partners allows for same-sex marriage.112 Not all the Member States 
apply such a favor matrimonii rule, however, which makes it in practice impossible to celebrate a same-
sex marriage between the partners coming from homophobic Member States. This effetively 
downgrades the level of recognition of same-sex unions in such cases to same-sex partnerships. The 
requirement of a marriage ‘lawfully concluded in the host Member State’, could thus be a very difficult 
one and, considering states not applying favor matrimonii laws, potentially undermines the whole point 
of the Directive. This extends discrimination, via the medium of private law, from the homophobic 
Member States to the rest of the EU, thus promoting the violations of ECHR law through very unusual 
means. In casu, Romanian law was of no relevance, since the law of the State of New York was 
applicable, but in any other factual situation (e.g. an applicant marrying in a different Member State or 
one coming from the states hostile to same-sex marriage), concluding a marriage would be much more 
difficult. It is clear, in this context – again agreeing with Jessurun d’Oliveira and with AG Wathelet113 
– that although Coman revolved around a marriage celebrated in the host Member State, this should not 
per se be a requirement for benefiting from free movement of persons law in the EU. Any state, including 
third counties, could definitely produce the same legal effects, once the marriage is recognized in the 
EU. Here, again, the language adopted by the Court is dangerously narrow and could lead to 
misinterpretation, while marrying in the State of New York should have been sufficient, under previous 
case-law,114 to claim a derivative free movement right for Mr Hamilton, a US citizen, to enter and reside 
in Romania with his spouse.  
 
110  Cf. Biagioni, “On Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships”, in Gallo, Paladini and Pustorino (Eds.), 
Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Springer, 2014), 360–361; Wautelet, 
“Private International Law Aspects of Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships in Europe: Divided We Stand?”, in Boele-
Woelki and Fuchs (Eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012), 165; 
Kochenov, “On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States”, supra note 6. 
111  Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Het Europese Hof omarmt eindelijk het huwelijk van mensen met hetzelfde geslacht’ NJb 2018/1426. 
See also Bell and Bačić Selanec, supra note 6, at 671. 
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113  Para. 50 of his Opinion in Coman. 
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Questions about the dangers of ‘strengthening family life’ formulae 
There is a real problem with the ‘created or strengthened’ family life language the Court employs.115 
Families go through phases. In Shortbus, the main character is a married woman who discovers she 
craves a bisexual threesome relationship, and whose first orgasm coincides with the great blackout of 
New York City. One does not need to see this movie to realize that family life can linger on the 
backburner, freeze, or, sometimes, be reborn again. A cold family on the ruins of a love that died is still 
a family, however, as much as an open relationship involving more than two. Likewise, a long-distance 
union of hearts, where partners never see each other but could nevertheless be dearly present in each 
other’s lives, are families all the same. ‘Strengthening’ language opens a Pandora’s box of a potentially 
disastrous ECJ intervention into what should be the partners’ realm only. Free movement should apply 
to families getting ready to divorce, to those who hate each other, and to those families in which one of 
the partners is preparing to die. What is going on between the partners is not and cannot possibly be the 
ECJ’s business. Moreover, this has been the classic approach in the case law all along, recalling the facts 
of Singh, in which a UK/third-national couple moved back to the UK to divorce and was exempted from 
immigration controls via the application of EU law. Considering the astonishing variety of human bonds 
and interactions falling under the umbrella term of ‘family’, the last thing we want is the Court unable 
to utter the word ‘sex’ to tell us what ‘strengthening’ is.116 Consider how the Court has reduced human 
agency in other fields, such as ‘integration’ into the society of the host state,117 ‘work’,118 or ‘sufficient 
resources’,119 bringing disaster to a great number of families and giving EU free-movement law an 
awkward illiberal turn. This hits both workers and other citizens hard,120 and makes the Court a true 
‘actor of injustice’121 in the eyes of some. The sacrifices made in achieving levels of protection for the 
ordinary men and women all around the EU teach a simple lesson. Whatever the reasons for the Court 
to take steps back – and either they fail to convince the addressees, thereby ensuring that the sacrifices 
of rights made are probably not entirely in vain122 – it is better for the Court to stay out of our lives and 
our of our beds. Coman regrettably fails this ‘no harm done’ test by venturing into the ‘strengthening’ 
enigmas not mandated by either secondary or primary law. 
Questions about non-binary unions and the future of public policy in this field 
This brings us, lastly, to a most fundamental question concerning other types of marriage. What about 
ménages à trois? Member States have made their policy choices – all of them favour one particular type 
of a binary unions: polygamy is outlawed and second and further spouses are expressly not covered by 
the Family Reunification Directive.123 Observing the networks of wives, friendships and love-triangles 
on the ground around the EU the question arises how far this kind of favouring of particular 
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configurations of relationships actually corresponds to reality and can be justified?124 This is not an 
empty question. Once recognizing the ‘dignity’ of a same-sex marriage is a frontier passed, what 
arguments, if any, could there be in stock to fight against a three-partner marriage (whatever the sexes 
of the lovers)? Public policy, of course, will not do the trick. Indeed, it is quite unclear, who, besides 
state-sponsored hypocrisy, is harmed by moving beyond heteronormative binary relationships. Instead, 
we confine other types of relationships to the fringes of society; secret, unrecognized, frowned upon, for 
no clear reason. It is thus impossible to agree with positions in scholarly literature, stating that, to quote 
Bell and Bačić Selanec, “on a human rights level, a fundamental distinction must be drawn between 
same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage”,125 citing legal instruments and case-law in support of 
this statement, which used to bash same-sex partners still ten years ago. Such statements are entirely 
empty and counterproductive, if no arguments are given in their support besides ‘while loving your 
same-sex partner – something that was untenable and immoral before – is ok, don’t you dare loving two 
people!’ What we are witnessing is the culture of justification in action:126 the beating heart of modern 
constitutionalism. Once good arguments are not available to defend the limiting involvement of the 
authority, the rule should go. It is thus very difficult to disagree with Nora Markard’s excellent analysis: 
“in the cases of both polygamy and incest, as with same-sex marriage, moral disapproval – the ‘yuck 
factor’ – has to yield in the face of autonomy and privacy; only rational reasons can sustain a prohibition 
of marriage”.127 The EU has played a crucial role in the process of bringing down absurd rules continent-
wide. This process, should one believe Gareth Davies, often amounted to the humiliation of states by 
confronting them with the utterly, inexplicably stupid choices they make.128 Coman is a great example 
of that. Yet, the pressure will obviously be mounting to explain to a married woman why she cannot 
also marry her long-term female lover. The absurdity of pretending that long-standing multi-partner 
relationships are not a day-to-day practice is self-evident, yet, the law is frequently not on the social 
reality side. Precisely as the Romanian Civil Code, which will not be applied in Coman.  
There is a curious fact one has to raise in the context of polygamy. The EU is a jurisdiction where 
registered partnerships and marriages de jure tend to be worlds apart, and where some marriages are not 
universally recognized as marriages. Consequentially, following the outcome of Coman, EU law 
obviously makes polygamy legally possible throughout the Member States. Having married Thijs in 
Brussels, Leszek can return to native Poland, where this marriage will not be recognized and thus form 
no legal impediment for him to marry Volha in Natolin. As underlined by David de Groot, this is a most 
ironic outcome of trying to uphold one crucial rule about marriage throughout the EU: total intolerance 
of polygamy.129 Be it as it may, this is a great development, as long as Leszek is happy (just as is Thijs 
and as is Volha, should they be informed about it).  
Federal rainbow dream: comparative outlook  
AG Wathelet mentions a broad comparative paradigm for Coman, specifying that jurisdictions as 
diverse as Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Argentina, USA and Taiwan have all opened the gate 
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for same-sex marriages.130 In the EU itself, apart from thirteen Member States which have legalized 
homosexual marriage, nine other Member States have a registered partnership open to couples of the 
same sex (Slovenia, Czechia, Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Cyprus, Greece and Italy). Emerging 
global consensus on the issue is absolutely clear.131 Hence, the days when constitutional lawyers would 
say that only a small number of EU countries recognizes same-sex unions are entirely passé. This is 
even more the case given that not offering a registered partnership (at least) in the national law is now a 
violation of the ECHR.132 There is a clear consensus that cannot be overlooked by the Court of Justice 
regarding a nascent recognition of same-sex unions in the absolute majority of EU Member States these 
days. Yet American jurisprudence and the liberalization from the European Court of Human Rights 
remain undoubtedly the major inspirations for advancing the federal track on litigating same-sex 
marriages in Coman via EU law.  
A somewhat schizophrenic judgement of the US Supreme Court came in the case of Masterpiece Cake 
Shop, which preceded the judgement in Coman just by one day. The case regarded the religious 
sensibilities of a Colorado baker, who refused to deliver a cake for a gay wedding. Another judgment of 
the US Supreme court, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).133 stands as a crucial example of a federal 
opportunity for gays and lesbians — a legal track that has been explored by lawyers with regard to 
Coman. Although Obergefell was widely streamlined in the media as the judgement about same-sex 
marriages, de jure the decision is more about recognition of rights derived from marriage than status, 
which ironically made the recognition of status all over the American states only a question of time. The 
case was launched after a same-sex couple, James Obergefell and John Arthur, married in Maryland. 
Their state of residence – Ohio – did not recognize their marriage license, and they went to court. John 
Arthur was terminally ill and suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. For this reason, they wanted 
the other partner, James Obergefell, to be identified as his surviving spouse on his death certificate, 
based on their marriage in Maryland. Through this paradigm of rights based on free movement between 
the states, the Supreme Court established that a there is a fundamental right to marry guaranteed to same-
sex couples by the Due Process clause and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States constitution.  
The European Court of Human Rights quickly followed with the Oliari & Others v. Italy (2015) 
judgement,134 where the Court suddenly established that Italy should offer some form of registered 
partnership or marriage to gay couples. How far-reaching the distinction between the two can be is 
limited by ECHR law and expressly includes family reunification, following Pajić. It is remarkable that 
in Oliari, the ECtHR refers to comparative jurisprudence, giving the example of the decision in the US 
Supreme court that preceded Strasbourg by just a couple of weeks.135 This Strasbourg judgement also 
captures the growing consensus in the Member States of the Council of Europe, noting that 11 countries 
of the Council of Europe recognized same-sex marriages, while 18 offered recognition of various forms 
of same-sex partnerships at the moment of the decision.136 Of course in Coman, the ECJ rounded this 
important circle of federal thinking, adding to a tacit-recognition track for same sex marriages visible in 
the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights. Coman allows 
asking uncomfortable questions about the state of the rule of law in Romania and the ability of that 
country to offer effective protection of rights to its citizens, thus fully benefiting from the membership 
of the Council of Europe and the European Union.  
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Once again, following Oliari and Pajić, it was beyond any doubt that Romania was in breach of ECHR 
law, since it did not create a status as demanded by Oliari and did not offer a family-reunification track, 
as demanded by Pajić. Worse still, considering the interaction between the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and ECHR, no doubt could possibly arise that the Directive 2004/ 38 had not been correctly 
implemented in Romania. It is well known what had to be done in such cases; in a vertical situation, the 
national Court sets aside the provisions of the Civil Code. However, this was been done, showcasing, 
yet again, the disastrous level of the rule of law in the country and asking bigger questions. If the 
situation is so bad in this particular field, where unequivocal ECtHR case law and EU law are being 
ignored – and considering the ECtHR’s systemic enforcement issue137 – what is going on in other fields? 
Coman stands as a reminder that the level of development of the basic legal capacities in the Member 
States differ drastically from one state to another.  
To conclude: sexual market citizenship in the making?  
Although the judgment is very narrowly construed, gradual acceptance of same-sex marriage in the most 
heteronormative countries, for whatever reason, is bound to be one-way street. The examples of 
developments in plenty of jurisdictions worldwide clearly show this. Increasing practical recognition of 
foreign same-sex marriages, for whatever purpose, demonstrates the flimsy hypocrisy underlying the 
lack of acceptance in other spheres. This is bound to bring about, gradually, changes of radical scale.138 
In other words, to agree with Massmo Fichera, “a legal system may sometimes be bound to recognize 
social facts, and transnational law may enhance this phenomenon”.139 
EU citizenship is not only a unique space to ‘overcome’ nationality, often imagined in terms of the 
dominant ethnicity of Member States. “EU sexual citizenship”140 equally offers an activist arena for 
challenging sexual identities and inequalities embedded in those national citizenships, trans-
nationalizing discourse on rights and gay emancipation – especially in Central and Eastern Europe – as 
a matter of EU law. European, in this context, becomes a language of rights and entitlements, which can 
be turned, inter alia, against their own states of nationality, albeit approached through a free-movement 
/ internal market lens. Besides the dull and morally-questionable mantras of ‘market citizenship’,141 now 
turning into ‘market sexual citizenship’, EU federalization fosters the social imagination of EU citizens 
and social movements who, in turn, rely on EU equality standards as a strategy for humiliating member 
states. European becomes the language of rights and entitlements. EU sexual citizenship turns into a 
realm to discipline embarrassment in the Union. Dictating gender roles, sexual choices and lifestyles is 
not yet fully precluded. Yet, thanks to the EU, it is finally a cause for shame, and yields less cash. 
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